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                                  NOT PRECDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-3566 
____________ 
 
BAYSHORE FORD TRUCK SALES, INC., a Delaware corporation;  
MOTOR CITY FORD TRUCKS, INC., a Delaware corporation;  
COLONY FORD TRUCK CENTER, INC., a Rhode Island corporation, 
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY 
 
BAYOU CITY FORD TRUCK SALES, INC.; CROSSTOWN FORD SALES, INC.;  
DAVE GILL TRUCKS, INC.; DUTHLER FORD TRUCK, INC.; EAGLE TRUCK 
SALES OF WISCONSIN; EAST BAY TRUCK CENTER; LACY MOTORS, INC.; 
LAKE ERIE FORD TRUCK CENTER; LAKELAND TRUCK CENTER, INC.;  
LONG LEWIS OF CULLMAN, INC; MARTIN AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC.;  
MIKE PRUITT FORD; NATIONAL CAR SALES, INC.; NORTHWEST TRUCK  
AND TRAILER SALES, INC.; O'CONNOR TRUCK SALES, INC; ROBERTS  
FORD TRUCKS; ROCK RIVER FORD, INC.; RON BLACKWELL FORD, INC.; 
SACRAMENTO VALLEY FORD TRUCK SALES, INC.; SEA-TAC FORD  
TRUCK SALES,  INC.; SOUTHWEST TRUCK SALES,  INC.;  
WHITEFORD FORD TRUCK, INC.; WHITEFORD TRUCK CENTER FW, INC.; 
WOLF MOTOR COMPANY; W. W. WALLWORK, INC.,  
                                                                                                                                                
                                   Appellants 
 
       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D. C. No. 2-99-cv-00741) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 
       
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on July 18, 2013 
2 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 26, 2013) 
   
 
O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 In this appeal, the Appellants—twenty-five plaintiffs in the above-captioned 
litigation—appeal the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Ford.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I. Background1
Until 1997, Ford was a manufacturer of heavy trucks.  Ford sold its heavy trucks 
through a network of independent, franchised dealers.  Ford’s relationship with its dealers 
was governed by a standard contract, the Sales and Service Agreement.  If Ford or a 
dealer terminated the Sales and Service Agreement, a dealer could elect to accept certain 
termination benefits.  However, Paragraph 23 of the agreement provided in relevant part 
that, “[u]pon the Dealer’s election to accept any of such benefits, or upon the Dealer’s 
demand of any such benefits upon any termination or nonrenewal by the Dealer, [Ford] 
shall be released from any and all other liability to the Dealer with respect to all 
relationships and actions between the Dealer and [Ford].”  Paragraph 23 further stated 
that, “[s]imultaneously with the receipt of any benefits so elected or demanded, the 
Dealer shall execute and deliver to [Ford] a general release . . ..” 
 
                                              
1 We write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts of this case.  
Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis. 
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In 1997, Ford announced that it would no longer manufacture heavy trucks.  
Shortly thereafter, twenty-four of the twenty-five Appellants sent resignation letters 
demanding termination benefits under the Sales and Service Agreement.  At or around 
the same time, the same group also sent letters in accordance with Paragraph 23 of the 
agreement, acknowledging receipt of termination benefits and releasing Ford from any 
liability except for the termination benefits owed by Ford.  The letters were based on a 
template provided by Ford, but every letter was unique because each Appellant 
demanded personalized concessions.  However, the language releasing Ford from liability 
was substantially the same in all of the letters.  For example, one release letter stated:  
“[I]n accordance with Paragraph 23 of the Ford Sales and Service Agreement, we hereby 
release Ford from all other liability to us, except for such amounts as Ford may have 
agreed in writing to pay us, and will furnish Ford a satisfactory general release.”  
The remaining Appellant, W.W. Wallwork, Inc., did not resign its heavy truck 
dealership under the terms of the Sales and Service Agreement.  Rather, it settled then-
pending litigation with Ford by relinquishing its heavy truck dealership and receiving a 
medium truck franchise in its place.  Under the terms of the settlement, Wallwork agreed 
to “release and forever discharge Ford . . . from all claims, actions, causes of actions, 
rights, or obligations, whether known or unknown, contingent or liquidated, of every 
kind, nature and description.”  The settlement agreement provided that it would be 
governed by North Dakota law. 
In 1999, five of Ford’s heavy truck dealers filed suit against Ford alleging a 
violation of the Federal Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1221, et seq., 
4 
and asserting several Michigan common law claims.  The claims arose out of Ford’s 
decision to stop manufacturing heavy trucks.  In 2006, the District Court granted the five 
dealers’ motion for class certification to bring their claims on behalf of all Ford heavy 
truck dealers.   
In December 2005, the District Court granted summary judgment to the class on 
its claim that Ford breached the Sales and Service Agreement.2
II. Standard of Review 
  Ford then moved for 
summary judgment as to the Appellants, arguing that their claims were barred by the 
release provision in Paragraph 23 of the Sales and Service Agreement between Ford and 
the Appellants.  The District Court agreed and held that the twenty-five Appellants would 
be excluded from the class.  Following entry of final judgment as to the remaining class 
members, this appeal followed. 
We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary judgment.  See Liberty 
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 676 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2012).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when there is no issue in dispute regarding any material 
fact, so that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.  A grant of 
summary judgment is reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Id. 
This means that all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-movant’s favor.  Id.  
                                              
2 This breach of contract claim is the subject of a related appeal before us in No. 12-4342. 
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III. Discussion3
The Appellants allege two errors:  (1) the District Court incorrectly held that they 
released all claims against Ford and (2) the District Court should have held that Ford 
violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by soliciting waivers from the Appellants.  
These arguments are unavailing. 
 
A. The Appellants Released All Claims Against Ford 
The District Court held that, upon resigning their dealerships, demanding 
termination benefits, and electing to accept those benefits, the twenty-four Appellants 
who resigned their dealerships released any and all claims against Ford under Paragraph 
23 of the Sales and Service Agreement.  The Appellants disagree, arguing that the 
releases they executed in 1997 are controlling because those releases were agreements 
separate from the Sales and Service Agreement.4
                                              
3 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1367.  
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
  In support of this proposition, the 
4 The Appellants seek a ruling that the 1997 releases supersede Paragraph 23 of the Sales 
and Service Agreement because they take the position that the 1997 releases are not 
binding due to a lack of consideration.  As a result, the Appellants assert that their claims 
should be allowed to proceed against Ford.  As discussed below, the 1997 releases do not 
supersede the Sales and Service Agreement.  Therefore, we need not decide whether the 
1997 releases were supported by consideration. 
 
To the extent that the Appellants argue that the release in Paragraph 23 of the Sales and 
Service Agreement was not supported by consideration, this argument is meritless.  
“Where there is no specific recitation of separate consideration for the release, but it is 
part of a larger contract involving multiple promises, the basic rule of contract law is that 
whatever consideration is paid for all of the promises is consideration for each one[.]”  
Rowady v. K Mart Corp., 428 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Mich. App. 1988).  Here, the contract 
involved multiple promises and also included a release provision.  There was no 
recitation of specific consideration for the release.  Ford provided consideration for all of 
the promises made by the Appellants by agreeing, among other things, to supply the 
6 
Appellants point to the fact that each release letter is different because they contain 
individually negotiated benefits.   
The Appellants’ argument is unavailing.  Even though the release letters they 
executed in 1997 were individually negotiated to provide different termination benefits to 
each Appellant, the portions of those letters that released Ford from liability were 
substantially the same as the release contemplated in Paragraph 23.  Therefore, we hold 
that the release language in the 1997 letters merely memorialized the terms that the 
Appellants agreed to in Paragraph 23 of the Sales and Service Agreement.5
“The scope of a release is controlled by the language of the release, and where . . . 
the language is unambiguous, we construe it as written.”  Adair v. State, 680 N.W.2d 386, 
400 (Mich. 2004) (citation omitted).  “A contract is ambiguous when two provisions 
irreconcilably conflict with each other or when [a term] is equally susceptible to more 
than a single meaning[.]”  Coats v. Bastian Brothers, Inc., 741 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Mich. 
App. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  “[C]ontract construction, 
that is, the legal operation of the contract, is a question of law mandating plenary 
review.”  In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 533 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
Several other courts have addressed identical contractual language and reached the 
same result as the District Court.  See, e.g., Rochester Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 
                                                                                                                                                  
Appellants with heavy trucks to sell.  Therefore, the Sales and Service Agreement was 
supported by consideration.  
5  This is equally true as to the seven Appellants who signed release letters before 
submitting resignation letters.  As to these Appellants, Paragraph 23’s liability release 
language was triggered when they elected to accept termination benefits, as 
acknowledged in their release letters. 
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287 F.3d 32, 40 n.4 (1st Cir. 2002) (“An election of benefits . . . automatically triggers the 
general release of paragraph 23.”); DeValk Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 811 
F.2d 326, 330 (7th Cir. 1987) (“We can scarcely conceive of a more clearly written 
release of liability.”).  For the same reasons articulated by the District Court and the 
courts of appeals, we find that Paragraph 23 is unambiguous:  it unequivocally states that 
when a dealer resigns its franchise, demands termination benefits, or accepts those 
termination benefits, Ford is fully released from any liability.  This is precisely what 
happened here.  The subsequent release was merely a memorialization of the initial 
release contained in paragraph 23.  DeValk, 811 F.2d at 331.  Therefore, the District 
Court correctly held that twenty-four of the Appellants’ claims were barred by the release 
in Paragraph 23.6
As to the settlement between W. W. Wallwork and Ford, that agreement also was 
an effective and valid release of all claims against Ford.  The settlement agreement was 
governed by North Dakota law, which is the same as Michigan law for all purposes 
relevant to this appeal.  See First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Scherr, 435 N.W.2d 704, 706 
(N.D. 1989).  The settlement agreement released Ford from all claims “in any way 
connected with the Wallwork Parties’ operation of the Ford dealership and their other 
operations in Fargo, North Dakota.”  This language is unambiguous.  W. W. Wallwork 
plainly released all claims against Ford.  Therefore, we will not disturb the District 
Court’s ruling as to W. W. Wallwork. 
 
                                              
6 Because the release in Paragraph 23 is enforceable against the Appellants, we need not 
consider their argument that the subsequent releases signed in 1997 were unenforceable 
due to a lack of consideration.   
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B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Ruling That Ford 
Did Not Violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
 
The Appellants further allege that Ford undermined the integrity of the class action 
process by obtaining releases from putative class members in violation of Rule 23.  This 
argument is without merit.  Under Rule 23(d), a district court has a duty to “safeguard 
class members from unauthorized [and] misleading communications from the parties and 
their counsel.”  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. & Guar. Nat’l Bank of Tallahassee Second 
Mortg. Loan Litig., 418 F.3d 277, 310 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration in original).  Consequently, a court may enter orders necessary 
to protect the integrity of the litigation.  See id.  We review the district court’s decision to 
grant relief under Rule 23(d) for an abuse of discretion.  Id. 
The Appellants assert that Ford’s conduct undermined the integrity of the 
litigation because Ford reached out to the Appellants and asked each entity to execute a 
release.  We disagree.  Ford’s solicitation of written releases in 1997 was plainly 
contemplated by the parties because it was expressly stated in Paragraph 23 of the Sales 
and Service Agreement.  Moreover, Ford’s conduct did nothing to undermine the 
integrity of the litigation because the releases that Ford obtained merely memorialized the 
substance of Paragraph 23.  Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
declining to grant relief to the Appellants under Rule 23(d).   
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
